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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
It's two-thirty in the morning. Two vehicles approach
two different Naval Installation main gates. Both vehicle
operators are active duty Navy men with several years of
military service under their belts. The operator of vehicle
1 slows, dims the headlamps, and stops adjacent to the gate
shack. The guard, is sitting at his desk and is talking on
the telephone, looks up and motions the vehicle operator to
proceed. The driver, however, is in need of directions and
thus remains stopped. It is apparent to the driver that from
his position the guard is unable to see the DOD Registration
decal on the vehicle's bumper. Additionally, since the
operator is dressed in civilian clothing there is no way the
guard knows the identity of the driver. Eventually, the
guard approaches the vehicle operator and inquires what the
driver needs. It is then that the vehicle operator notes
that the guard is apparently a DOD Guard. The guard is in
his late forties and is slightly overweight.
The circumstances are somewhat different for the operator
of vehicle 2. He too, is in civilian attire. He approaches
the main gate, dims the headlights, and stops. He, however,
is greeted by a young Marine Guard who quickly notices the
DOD Registration decal and renders a smart salute and
appropriate military courtesy. Furthermore, he instructs the
driver to produce his Military Identification Card and
positively identifies the driver.
The situations depicted above are not intended to portray
the DOD Guard force as lackadaisical, fat, or negligent in
their duties: nor the Marine Guard force as young, vigilant,
and efficient. It is, however, intended to raise the
question of how are security forces at Naval Installations
determined? Why does one installation have security guard
forces made up of civilians and another of military
personnel? Further questions such as the following come to
mind; What are the policies concerning the choice? Who makes
such decisions? Is it the nature of security functions
performed? Which type is more effective and efficient? Can
elements such as productivity, effectiveness, and efficiency
in security organizations be measured?
B. GENERAL
Some of these questions and issues are difficult to
answer. Take for example, the last area; productivity,
effectiveness, and efficiency. In manufacturing
environments, productivity is broadly defined as the ration
of output per unit of input over time. Productivity compares
the amount of resources used with the volume of products or
services produced. In the long run, productivity is improved
by innovation or changes in the means of production. In the
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short run, productivity is improved by raising the efficiency
with which resources are utilized within the existing system
of production. The productivity concept refers to an
accurately measured total physical output of end-products of
an organization, divided by the measure of the total amount
of resources used, such as total man-hours worked or total
cost in constant prices. Effectiveness is described as the
desirable effects or benefits gained by reason of the
expenditure or incurring of a cost. Effectiveness also
connotes some measure of performance or level of output of
the benefit producing system. Efficiency is described as the
ration of actual performance numbers to standard performance
usually expressed as a percentage. In these cases
(manufacturing situations) productivity, effectiveness, and
efficiency are all items that are quantifiable and
measurable. In a security department these items are
difficult to define and are not measurable in monetary or any
other terms. In the manufacturing organization the goal is
earning profits. In a security organization the goal should
be to render as much protective service as possible with a
given amount of resources or to use as few resources as
possible to render a given amount of service. In most
situations, the desirable financial performance in this type
of organization is a break-even performance, that is, in
general and over the long run, provided funds should equal
expenses. In short, a security department should be both
11
efficient and effective: it's not the case of choosing one or
the other. Efficient security organizations must render
their services with the lowest consumption of resources ana
effective security organizations must strive towards tne
accomplishment of goals. [Ref. l:pp. 195-197]
C. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is three-fold in nature: 1) to
examine the major issues and policy decisions surrounding the
choice oetween having security services provided oy civilians
or military personnel, including the cost of these services;
2) examine appropriate trade-offs, and risks: and 3) enhance
knowledge and awareness in the aforementioned areas
concerning installation security for decision makers.
D. METHODOLOGY
Since the heart of the issue is costs associated with the
performance of security functions at military installations,
this study will explore the cost of security performed by
civilians and Dy military personnel at two Naval
Installations. The installations: Moffett Naval Air Station
and Oakland Naval Supply Center were selected for three
reasons:
1. their proximity;
2. their security force composition; and




II. THE SECURITY FORCE
A. GENERAL
The security department of a military installation
performs various functions related to base and physical
security. The individual responsible for all security
functions is the installation commanding officer. He is
ultimately responsible for all aspects of physical security
of all facilities within the confines of the installation and
the promulgation of regulations necessary to meet this
objective. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1 & Ref. 3:p. 3-1] Physical security
is that part of an overall security program which is
concerned with the physical measures designed to prevent
unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material and
documents and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,
damage, theft, or other covert acts which would in some
degree lessen the ability of the activity to perform its
mission or affect overall material interests.
The security force constitutes one of the most important
elements of an activity's physical security program. It
provides the enforcement implementation medium in the
physical security effort. The security force consists of
designated personnel specifically organized, trained, and
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equipped to provide the physical security for the command.
Security forces at Naval Installations may be composed of:
1. DOD civilian security police.
2. DOD civilian security guards.
3. General Services Administration (GSA) guards.
4. Contract guards (commercial security services).
5. Military force (Navy and Marine Corps personnel).
6. ComDinations of the above.
In overseas locations certain Naval activities are also
protected by foreign nations. [Ref. 4:p.4-l]
Guidance for the appropriate employment of Marine Corps
Security Force components is set forth in SECNAVINST 5530.4,
Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) barracks and detachments
ashore and afloat. The primary mission of Marine Corps
Security Force personnel is to provide physical security for
those portions of naval activities that requires the unique
capabilities of an armed, combat trained Marine. The current
legislative basis for the MCSF is found in Title 10 USCS 5013
which states, in part, that the Marine Corps shall provide
security detachments and organizations for the protection of
naval property at naval stations and bases . . . these
additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the
operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
In determining whether a MCSF is required the basic question,
"Does this post require an armed, combat trained Marine?" is
of primary consideration. To answer this question, a
1^
validation process has been established. The validation
process is to ensure the most efficient Navy wide allocation
of MCSF assets. The process addresses validation of existing
posts and validation of new posts. Valiaation may occur as
often as one a year to delete, modify, or add posts as
requirements change for the command. Even when changes are
not required, higher authority dictates that the time
interval between validations is not to exceed three years.
The security problem is influenced by the mission of the
activity, the type and jurisdiction of the property, the
geographic location and size of the activity, the topography
of the area, the economic and political atmosphere, potential
and existing threats, logistical, and operational support
provided by other organizations.
Regardless of the type of security force employed, their
functions fall into three basic categories:
1. Protect life, property, and the rights of
i ndi V 1 dual s
.
2. Prevent and/or deter theft and other losses such as
fire, damage, accident, sabotage, espionage,
trespassing, etc.
3. Enforcement of security rules, regulations, and
policies. CRef. 4:p. 4-13
B. DETERMINATION OF POSTS AND SECURITY FORCE STRENGTH
No two activities are identical. Therefore it is
impractical to set fixed rules for the determination of posts
as to location, type, and number. Commanding Officers must
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evaluate their command to aetermine the numoer ana type of
posts required to provide the optimum protection.
Consideration of different security measures such as the use
of electronic intrusion detection systems, closea circuit
television, and securing gates during low usage. Posts
normally fail into three basic types; fixea, mobile, ana
administrative. Fixed posts are those where security
personnel normally remain at one point or within a specific
area. Examples are gates and towers. Mobile posts are often
referrea to as roving patrols. These are used for perimeter
surveillance and area patrols. Examples are foot, bicycle,
motorcycle, vehicle, and boat patrols. Administrative posts
include the security or police chief, other supervisory
personnel, i aent i f i cat i on and pass clerks, dispatchers, alarm
system monitoring personnel, training specialists, traffic
and criminal investigators, clerks, and stenographers. [Ref.
4:p. 4-6]
The number of positions in the security force is normally
basea on the number of 24 hour posts to be manned. The total
number of personnel per post depends on the type of force
used. [Ref. 4:p. 4-6]
1. A post manned by enlisted Marines normally requires
six Marines per post.
2. A post manned by enlisted Navy personnel normally
requires five personnel per post.
3. A post manned by civil service or contract security
personnel has a different number obtained through the
use of a set formula. For example, after determining
16
the numoer of posts required, the approximate numoer
of security personnel can be calculated as shown
below. One post requires 168 man hours per week.
Compute the total number of man hours per weeK for
all actual posts and divide by 168. Calculate the
average number of aays of annual leave and sick leave
anticipated. From Table I. find the "number of
guards per posts required" appropriate to the average
leave anticipated. Multiply this figure by the
number of posts required.
Supervisory personnel may be included in the post
calculations or figured separately ana then added to the
requ i rement
.
The formula, however, does not reflect man-hours required
for initial, annual, ana specialized training, special
details or other assignments. If these requirements are
fairly consistent, past experience can be usea to calculate
"averages" which can then be included into the formula. If
these requirements are not consistent or are not valid
security functions, consi aerat i on should be given to the use
of over-time, doubling up of posts, or curtailment of the
requirement to accomplish valid assignments or functions.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATING CIVILIAN SECURITY FORCE STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS
Anticipated avg. no. of days off No. of personnel per post
for annua! & sick leave per ind. required (40 hr . wk .
)
4 . 20
20 4 . 55
25 4 . 65
30 4 . 75
35 4 . 85
40 4 . 96
EXAMPLE:
POST #1 1 individual, 24 hours, 7 days = 168 hours
POST #2 1 inoividual, 24 hours, 7 days = 168 hours
POST #3 2 individuals, 16 hours, 7 days = 224 hours
1 individual . 8 hours, 2 days = 16 hours
Gate 1 individual, 10 hours, 5 days = 50 hours
Patrol 1 individual , 2 hours, 5 days = 10 hours
TOTAL HOURS 636 hours
636 IS then divided by 168, resulting in 3.78 posts. Average
annual and sick leave anticipated per individual is 30 days.
From the Table above we see that this case requires 4.75
personnel per post for each of the 3.78 posts. Multiplying
these figures (3.78 x 4.75) results in 17.95 (18) which is
the total of personnel needed on the force. [Ref. 4:pp. 4-8 &
4-9]
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The effectiveness of a security force is influenced by
the quality of its training program. Effective training
depends on leadership, proper organization, and efficient use
of available resources. Responsibility for the overall Navy
law enforcement and physical security program begins with the
CNO and proceeds down the chain of command to the Commanding
Officer, Security Officer, and the Security Department
Coordinator. The Commanding Officer''s responsibilities
include: ensuring that adequate law enforcement/security
training is conducted for all security force personnel in
according with OPNAVINST 5530.14; providing broad mission
guidance based on the command's requirements; allocating
sufficient training resources based on training needs and
priorities of his units. The Security Officer is responsible
for the specific security force training program at the
command; to ensure that all assigned security force personnel
are adequately trained; that adequate time is made available
to conduct the training; and to oversee the programs
administration, monitoring, and documentation. The Security
Department Training Coordinator shall be responsible for
developing and administering the training program from lesson
plans, for monthly, quarterly, and long range training plans,
and for graphic aids to testing and maintenance of individual
records. It is also his responsibl i ty to provide training
for all personnel in the security force. [Ref. 4:pp. 9-6 &
9-7]
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All new memDers of the security force are required to
complete Block #1 training requirements within four months
and Block #2 training requirements within nine months of date
of employment. [Ref. 4:p. 9-111. (Training requirements for
both Blocks are outlined in Appendix A which has been adapted
from Attachment 1 of OPNAVINST 5530. 14A, Physical Security
and Loss Prevention) New members must satisfactorily complete
Block #1 training requirements prior to performing
independent on-the-job security or law enforcement duties.
Security force personnel will not be issued firearms without
satisfactorily completing firearm qualifications as shown in
Appendix B, adapted from Tab A of OPNAVINST 5530. 14A,
Physical Security and Loss Prevention. The objective of
firearms training is to ensure that security force personnel
are qualified to employ firearms with accuracy and speed, and
without hazard to self, co-workers, or other parties. A
program of yearly qualification and quarterly familiarization
training is required. [Ref. 4:p. 9-15] The authority to arm
security force personnel is vested in the Commanding Office
[Ref. 5:p. 5-1 8. Ref. 6:p. 6-13
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Ill . AUGMENTATION OF THE SECURITY FORCE FOR EMERGENCIES
A. GENERAL
In the past decade, transnational and international
terrorist activiny has increased at an alarming rate and has
oeen the subject of much concern and expenditure of resources
dy world political leaders. In particular, the number of
terrorist groups, events, targets, victims, and damage caused
by terrorist groups has increased in an almost exponential
fashion. [Ref. 7:p. 7-1] There is a growing consensus among
the terrorist experts that terrorism, internationally and
domestically, can be expected to increase. The U.S. Senate,
concerned about the growing threat of terrorism to the United
States, recently formed the Senate Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism chaired oy former Admiral, now Senator,
Jeremiah Denton. In an opening statement on hearings
concerning the terrorist threat, 24 April 1981, Senator
Denton said.
Some have suggested that National Security and Terrorism
are non-issues; that the threat is ethereal and illusory.
I do not share these views. Surely, at one time or
another, all the diverse victims of terrorism have been led
to oelieve that there is no threat--" it can't happen here."
. . . If we continue to ignore the threat or define it
away be academic gymnastics, the sand in which we bury our
heads will eventually bury our nation ... In short, it
IS naive thinking that military installations will never be
the targets of terrorist attacks.
21
For such crimes, preparation of plans is required as part
of the overall physical security plan for use of security
force personnel to provide additional security, as required,
during emergencies and for augmentation by other additional
personnel and equipment.
B. CRISIS RESPONSE FORCE
Directives require all naval installations to organize,
equip and train its own crisis response force to prevent
disruption by onboard civil di sturoances , repel or contain
overt attack by criminal/terrorist elements, and to rapidly
restore essential activities which may have been disrupted by
civil disturbance, over attack, natural disaster or other
crisis. The crisis response force is made up of onboard
personnel, including civil service personnel, augmented and
supported oy other personnel as deemed necessary. Other
civilian employees may be used as staff/support elements of
the crisis response force for such functions as medical
assistance, f i ref i ght i ng, construction, casualty evacuation,
and communications.
The crisis response force should consist of security,
control, and administrative elements. The security elements
should be homogeneously organized, i.e., civilian security
force personnel, military security personnel, and other
military active duty personnel. Marine Corps Security Force
I
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personnel cannot be used without approval from the Secretary
of the Navy.
The size and composition of the crisis response force
depends largely on the size of the installation or activity,
geographical location, criticality of assets, vulnerability,
ana accessibility, as determined by the Commanding Officer.
The crisis response force should provide for the effective
utilization of available assets consistent with the
continuation of all essential functions during the crisis
si tuat ion
.
Because members of the crisis response force will be
involved in the containment of civil disturbances, it is
essential that all members be trained in the appropriate use
of force, and legal constraints on use of force and be
competent in the use of assigned weapons and equipment. [Ref
4:pp. 4-10 & 4-11]
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IV. SECURITY ORGANIZATION AT TWO NAVAL INSTALLATIONS
A. NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER, OAKLAND
The security force at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland
(NSCO), IS made up entirely of civilians. The civilian
security force may fall under two categories: General
Schedules (GS) civil service employees or contract personnel
furnished by private agencies under contract to the activity.
Those at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, fall under the
former (GS) category. Currently, positions with the Naval
Supply Center' s Security Organization are filled through a
"Merit" system, like other Federal Government jobs. This
means that selection for appointment is based on relative
qualification to perform the work in comparison to other
candidates as demonstrated oy past experience, both paid and
unpaid, education, and training. When opportunities exist,
positions are publicized at the Office of Personnel
Management Job Information Centers, state employment offices,
Civilian Personnel Offices at military installations, and
Personnel Offices of other Government agencies. U.S.
citizenship is a basic requirement followed by federal/local
policies concerning current employees (those employees
serving under career or career conditional appointment
wishing to transfer between government activities), former
employees, former overseas employees, and equal -opportun i ty
24
consi aerat 1 ons for protectea groups such as women,
minorities, veterans, and the handicapped.
Police services for NSCO are proviaed by 70 personnel;
one - Chief of Police, three - Captains, six - Sargeants, ana
60 Guaros. (Note: They are referrea to as guards because
positions are classified in a particular job series. In this
case it is a guard series. This means that more than 50% of
their Duties have oeen established as being guard related.)
Figure 1 shows how the organization fits into the overall
scheme in relation to other support areas. The cost for the
security force is shown in Table II. (With the exception of
the figures shown for the Chief of Police, all figures are
averages which were then multiplied by the number in that
position to arrive at a sub-total.)
Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Manpower Requirements are
shown on Table III.
All personnel assigned to the security force at NSCO have
completed and/or are completing training requirements as
outlined in Appendix A through on-the-job training (OJT).
Although personnel was successfully complete the law
enforcement and security training program at the Navy
Security Training Center, Lakehurat . New Jersey, are more
stringent. NSCO security force personnel do not meet or
cannot maintain physical standards required at Lakehurst
.
Additionally, past experience has shown that duties while at
25
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Asst . Security Officer
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ADP Security Information Admin, Fire Dept
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Security &
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Posi t i on Sa 1 arv Fringe Benefits/Leave Subtota i s^
Chief 26,381.00 7,750.74 34,256.74
(1 ea . ) 34 , 256 . 74
Capts 21,053.00 6,187.50 27,365.25
(3 ea. ) ... .63, 159.00 18,562.50 82,095.75
Sgts 18,433.00 5,419.88 23,977.88
(6 ea. ) . . .110,598.00 32,519.28 143,867.28
Guards 17,830.00 5,238.45 23,193.45
(60 ea. )1 ,069,800.00 314,307.00 1,391,607.00
TOTAL $1 ,651 ,826.77
x-Sub-total s include $125.00.00 Uniform Allowance per
i ndi V 1 dual .
Fringe benefits (social security, retirement, and health
benefits) are equal to 14% of the salary paid. Leave is
equal to 15.38% of the salary paid. For budget purposes the
figure $25,000.00 is used to compute the cost for one guard
per year. Using this figure, the cost for the 60 guards is










































































the training center requires the civilian personnel to exceed
normal working hours (over-time). Portions of duties are
considered to violate the job description, duties, and
functions outlined for guards in current union contracts. In
fact, there are several lawsuits pending, initiated by the
civilian unions, contesting these points and others, as of
the writing of this study. It is for these reasons that the
security force personnel at NSCO are no longer sent to the
aforementioned training center.
A survey taken of the personnel currently performing
security force duties at NSCO was conducted by this author to
determine the average type of individual employed. The
results of that survey revealed the following:
1. All personnel are males.
2. The average height is 5'' 8".
3. The average weight is 192.2 pounds.
4. The average age is 40.5 years.
The survey also showed that approximately 10% of the
entire security force is composed of individuals that have
retired from other occupations, and 4% are 60 years of age or
older. The average amount of experience in current position
is 4 years 11 months.
The turnover rate at NSCO has been estimated by the Chief
of Police at approximately 35% per year. This is undesirable
for several reasons, such as:
29
1. Release of personnel trained in sensitive operations
creates a possioie source of information for persons
seeKing to discover vulnerable points in a security
system.
2. The high cost factor involved in training
rep 1 acements
.
3. Frequent turnover oreaKs continuity of proceaural
familiarity and experience, which results in reouced
readiness and less effective protection.
B. NAVAL AIR STATION. MOFFETT FIELD
The security force at the Naval Air Station, Moffett
Field (NASM), is composed of 67 military personnel. The
security force is currently in a transition period resulting
from a ''new" Navy initiative promulgated on 28 Oct 1986 that
calls for a restructuring of how security is handled at Navy
installations. This initiative basically envisions the use
of an increased number of Navy officers and enlisted men to
perform base security functions. At the same time, it calls
for a new role in the use of Marine personnel. The effect at
Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, was the loss of their
Marine Detachment. During this transitional period, and
until the system can assign permanent personnel, the security
force is augmented by the use of Temporarily Assigned Duty
(TAD) personnel from the local tenant commands. The tenant
commands provide personnel in proportion to their size. The
largest tenant command provides ten individuals and the
smallest provides one. In total, there are 35 of these
indiviauals temporarily assigned to the NASM security force.
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During this transitional period, these personnel are assignee
to the gate section for a five month period. CNo set
criteria were established for the selection of these
personne I .
)
The remainder of the security force is composed of
permanently assignee personnel. Other than the
Master-at-Arms rates in the key supervisory positions, the
force is made up of various ratings on normal sea-shore
rotations. Figure II shows the organizational structure of
the security force. Table IV shows the cost for the security
force. The figures used in this determination of cost were
ODtained from the NAVCOMPT NOTICE 7041, Composite Stanaard
Military Rate Table, 26 Dec 1985. The rates in Table III
include basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, and basic
allowance for quarters. These taoles represent a realistic
picture of the actual military cost to fill a position.
Naval Air Station, Moffett, Manpower Requirements are
shown on Table V.
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Ch 1 ef of Po i 1 ce X 5
Patroi Chief X 5
Mill tary Work i ng Dog X 5





Trai n i ng X 5
Invest 1 gat 1 ons X 5
Operat i ons
Main Gate X X X 7
South Gate X X 7
NASA Gate X X 5
East Gate X X 5
TACAMO Compound X X X 7
Pass Issue X X X 7
Perimeter Patrol X X X 7
Desk X X X 7
Di spatch X X X 7
Patrol Zone 1 X X X 7
Patrol Zone 2 X X X 7
Patrol Zone 3 X X X 7
Patrol Zone 4 X X X 7
3^
TABLE V continued
Patrol Zone 5 x x x 7
Walking Patrol 1 x x x 7
Walking Patrol 2 x x x 7
Alarm Monitor x x x 7
All TAD personnel (Gate Section) receive five oays of
training prior to actual gate duties. Areas in Appendix A,
applicable to gate duties, are emphasized during this
relatively short training period. Twenty-two of the 32
permanently assignee personnel have successfully completed
the Law Enforcement and Security Training program at the Navy
Security Training Center, Lakehurst , New Jersey, or its
equivalent. The remaining portion of the permanently
assigned personnel have completed training requirements
outlined in Appendix A.
A survey, similar to the one conducted at the Naval
Supply Center, Oakland, was conducted at the Naval Air
Station, Moffett Field. The results of the survey are as
follows: (Unlike NSCO , NASM has female personnel performing
security duties; therefore, this survey is divided into two
parts according to sex.)
Females (10 assigned)
1. Average age: 21 years 6 months
2. Average height: 5^ 5.5"
3. Average weight: 124.9 pounds.
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Males (57 assigned)
1. Average age: 26 years 3.5 months
2. Average height: 5' 10.2"
3. Average weight: 165.9 pounds
The turnover rate for personnel assigned to NASM is
estimated by the Chief of Police at 40 to 45% per year. The
figure changes pending on the type of personnel received ana
their sea-shore rotation cycle. The same shortfalls related
to relatively high turnover rates mentioned previously for
civilians apply in this instance.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Measuring Performance
Early in this study, the concern was focused on such
areas as effectiveness, efficiency, and how they might be
measured in security organizations. What we should really be
concerned with is how well is the security service is being
performed. Efficiency and effectiveness are merely indices
in the determination of performance which excludes another
key element; equity. At this point, let us redirect our
attention to these areas.
Efficiency, as stated previously, measures the ratio
of service outputs to service inputs. In a security
organization the inputs are relatively easy to define:
typically, they are measured in dollars or in manpower. On
the other hand, it is well known that the outputs, in our
situation, are more difficult to define and measure
adequately. An efficiency measure that is finding increasing
favor in recent years is "the number of specific types of
incidents covered per police officer, per year." [Ref. 8:p.
57] (But this measure doesn^t provide a realistic indication
of efficiency in a low crime environment.) An intermediate
efficiency measure, one that can be used to assess the
internal organization and administration of a security
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organization, is man-hours of patrol per paid man-hour of
police time. The use of this measure implicitly assumes that
patrol prevents crime, a oeepiy held oelief that has oeen
questioned recently [Ref. 9:pp. 102-163 & Ref . 10:pp.
267-297], Another output measure that has oeen wiaely used
by management scientists who have examined the emergency
services (police, fire, and amouiance) is response time, the
time mat elapses between the call for help ana the arrival
of the emergency unit at the scene where help is needed.
(Implicitly, the output is deemed to De the deployment and
dispatching results in a lower cost to achieve a given
response time ana achieving other improvements by better
oeploymient of service units, i.e.. Hall. W. K., The
Application of Multifunction Stochastic Service Systems in
Allocating Amoulances for an Urban Area ; and Heller, N. B.,
and Stenzei, W. W., Design of Police Work Schedules .
Effectiveness is another important measure of
performance. It measures how well the need for the service
IS satisfied and the extent to which unintended adverse
impacts are avoided. It is the measure of adequacy of
service relative to need, and it incorporates the notion of
service quality. Once agaion, although it is difficult to
measure effectiveness in security organizations, it is oy no
means impossible. One way is to survey the level of citizen
satisfaction [Ref, ll:pp. 32-35], Another way is to analyze
trends/rates in the different incidents [Ref, 12 :pp . 124- 131 ]
,
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In many cities, the clearance rate (fraction of crimes for
which one or more arrests were made) is commonly used to
report the effectiveness in apprehensions [Ref. 8:pp. 76-79].
A service can be efficient but ineffective:
alternatively, it can be effective but inefficient. This can
be illustrated by a hypothetical police unit. One can
envision a police unit with a highly trained policeman that
is very efficient and aashes about from incident to incioent,
promptly investigating this or that, arresting individuals,
transporting them back to the station, then returning to his
patrol area ready to handle any emergency that may occur.
This police unit would be extraordinarily efficient if it
handled, say, two incidents an hour or about 16 in an eight
hour shift. However, it would be utterly ineffective if the
actual number of emergencies in the area averaged 20 per
shift. This would be an example of a highly efficient
service that is very ineffective: more police units are
needea. Alternatively, one can conceive of a very effective
police station where no one has to wait more than five
minutes to receive police assistance as units are promptly
dispatched. However, such a service may be extremely
inefficient if, in fact, it is staffed with so many units
that most of them ride around doing nothing for hours on end
because there is little demand for their service.
The last measure of service performance is equity.
It refers to the fairness, impartiality, or equality of
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service. Equity has been a concern of political scientists
and of economists but management scientists have tended to
focus their efforts on the issues of efficiency and
effectiveness and have paid relatively little attention to
the issues of equity. The objectives of many studies have
been to improve the efficiency and/or the effectiveness of a
service, and the analyses were usually intent on maximizing
or minimizing an appropriate measure for the entire
jurisdiction. But any security service can be efficient and
effective and could be perceived as inequitable if it fails
to treat all segments similarly.
Efficiency and effectiveness signs are insufficient
as performance measures for security services. Equity is of
equal importance, and the three interact.
While the development of definitions and measurement
of effectiveness, efficiency, productivity, and performance
in security organizations has eluded most researchers and
management practitioners, a unifying theme and a contingent
behavioral theory of these components do exist. Such a
theory, however, will have to evolve from a base of empirical
research. Further progress in development of a cumulative
theory will depend on progress in the development of
component (effectiveness, efficiency, productivity)
measurement tools.
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2. The Security Forces Examined
Though the study focused on only two security
organizations, sufficient information on each was examined
and presented to allow conclusions.
The cost to the respective installations, which are
fairly comparable in size in terms of the number of personnel
in the security forces, for the provision of security service
is relatively the same. The cost of the civilian security
force at NSCO totalled $1,651,826.77, while the cost of the
military security force at NASM totalled $1,793,134.00. The
difference is $141,307.23. If, however, the budgeted figure
used oy NSCO of $1,500,000.00 ($25,000 per guard) is used in
the computations the total becomes $1,760,219.00. The
difference is now $32,915.00. The readers are cautioned that
these figures represent the actual cost for manpower only.
The "merit" method used at NSCO for filling positions
and the use of various ratings on normal sea-shore rotations
at NASM both have inherent shortcomings. While the system
used by NSCO aims at being fair to veterans, women, other
protected groups, and the handicapped, it does not
necessarily lead to the selection of the best qualified
individual. For example, an applicant who was a cook during
the Vietnam conflict is hired over an applicant with five
years experience with the California Highway Patrol solely
because of the preference given to veterans of that period.
The latter is more qualified in terms of actual police
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experience and training, yet is not hired. The use of
sailors rotating to shore at NASM does nothing but provide
the needed shore billets for ratings that cannot be used
elsewhere. According to the Assistant Security Office at
NASM, sailors undergoing Law Enforcement and Physical
Security Training at Lakehurst have been known to disqualify
themselves to avoid being sent to any security force. The
use of sucn sailors also has the effect of having them work
outside their rate for a period of two to three years. This
could result in these individuals requiring remedial training
upon returning to sea assignments, or it may have a negative
impact on their promotabi 1 i ty
.
By choice, the security force at NSCO is trained
completely through on-the-job training. Over two-thirds of
the permanently assigned personnel at NASM have completed the
training provided at Lakehurst or its equivalent. The
question of what type of training is better is not examined
in this stuay. The item to consider is the time element.
Completion of both blocks of training outlined in Appendix A
through OJT requires about one year. Individuals completing
the same requirements at the Lakehurst Training Center (nine
weeks) can for the most part be completely entrusted to
perform most duties on arrival.
Both security forces have extremely high turnover
rates. The shortfalls of these situations were discussed in
Chapter IV and will not be repeated here.
It was of no surprise that the civilian force at NSCO
was slightly olaer and heavier than their military
counterparts at the Naval Air Station, Moffett Field. On the
average, the male individuals at NSCO are 2 inches shorter,
26.3 pounds heavier, and 14.2 years older. These points
shouia not De considered as acaaemic. In consideration of
the type of duties performed and the type of duties they
might be expectea to perform, the endurance, strength, and
agility typifying the younger individuals are important.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Overv 1 ew
During the first week of November 1986, the
Washington Post cameo an article, "Navy Planning Major
Overhaul of Security", pointing out that the Navy was
"putting the finishing touches on an overhaul of its internal
security procedures, which will emphasize more ant i -terror i sm
training for sailors and instruction in the use of weapons."
The article further stated that final approval of the plan
was still pending from Navy Secretary, John F. Lehman, Jr.;
however, few changes were expected. The following major
points were highlighted in the article:
a. Restructuring that "will strengthen our ability to
deter, detect and defeat terrorist attacks against
our service members, their dependents and our
resources .
"
b. "Key elements of the new structure are to incorporate
ant 1 -terror 1 St measures as an essential element of
every command's mission; to train and deploy our
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existing law enforcement ana guard forces for greater
ant 1 -terror 1 St effect; to train and employ large
numbers of Navy personnel as Auxiliary Security
Forces; and to reintroduce weapons proficiency as an
essential skill of all sailors.''
c. "Recruit training and officer accession courses will
include qualification in pistol and rifle fire and
additional interior guard and terrorism awareness
training."
d. ' Ant 1 -terror 1 St measures will be included in other
formal schools. Training in ant i -terror i st
protective measures will be provided to senior
officers."
2 . Comments
The planning of a major overhaul of the security
proceoures is definitely a positive move in the right
direction. Pro-active steps are finally being taken for
preparation of ant i -terror i st protective measures which
indirectly results in improving the overall readiness of the
sailors and officers. This action, however, on its own is
not enough. This is another classic example of doing more
with the resources already at hand.
What IS required is a plan that calls for the
replacement of the current system with a system that produces
a sailor who is specifically trained to be a professional law
enforcement/physical security specialist. In short, the Navy
should adopt a system akin to that which is currently used by
the Air Force.
In the Air Force, a Law Enforcement Specialist
receives training in the use of major items of equipment and
mocK-up trainers, such as portable radios, base station
radios, mobile transmitters/receivers, vehicles, M-16 rifles,
.38 caliber revolvers, leather gear, mace dispersers,
handcuffs, speedgun, Cardi o-Pu Imonary Resuscitation (CPR)
equipment, mock-up crime or incident scenes, mock-up Alert
Aircraft Area, mock-up weapons storage area, mock-up ouilding
search area, and mocK-up vehicle search area. Additionally,
they receive training in the following areas and in the
amounts (in hours) indicated: i.e. weapons (66), security
(2), communications (5), legal considerations and provisions
(12), police tactics (15), search procedures (12),
confrontation management (5), general duties (35), law
enforcement operations (18), crisis intervention/crimes and
incidents (25), traffic supervision and management (11),
resource protection (6), accident, disaster and incident
scene (3), protective measures against warfare agents (2),
detention/activities (2), and performance testing (35). The
Air Force Security Specialist (emphasis placed on security as
it IS a separate sub-specialty not to be confused with an Air
Force Law Enforcement Specialist) receives training in the
use of the equipment and mock-up trainers, such as portable
radios, base station radios, mobile transmitters/receivers,
vehicles M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns, M-203 grenade
launchers, not batons, handcuffs, audio pacK system, video
recorder/players, mock-up alert aircraft areas, mock-up
weapon storage area, mock-up missile launch facilities,
mock-up launch control facilities, and mock-up central
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security control. They also receive training in the
following areas with hours inaicated: i.e. Weapons (76),
security (2), communications C9), legal considerations ana
provisions (15), police tactics (35). confrontation
management (3), general duties (37), security operations
(18), resource protection (3). securing accident, disaster,
ana incident scenes (4), protective measures against warfare
agents (2), missile security (11), and performance testing
(35). The DOttom line is that highly trained inaivi duals are
produced in eight weeKS. Follow on schools for
sub-spec 1 a 1 t 1 es such as military working dog handlers are
al so aval 1 aol e
.
This preparation in the Navy would require the
creation of a new rate or expansion of the Master-at-Arms
rate. The rate would oe divided into two areas: Law
Enforcement and Physical Security Sub-Areas under Law
Enforcement might include Pass and Identification, Vehicle
Registration, Gates, Patrols, etc. The sub-areas under
Physical Security might include Aircraft and Flight lines.
Ammunition compounds. Fuel compounds. Warehouse compounas.
Brigs, etc. Further study for better utilization in
sub-areas would be requirea.
Recruitment for the new rate would begin at the E-1
level. A positive aspect of beginning at this level is that
the new rate would receive an individual that wants a career
in law enforcement and physical security. A dedicated
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individual from day one. This would provide for a heavier
lower ranking base structure. Currently many functions are
oeing performed by E-4's. E-S's, and E-6^s (on normal
sea-shore rotations) that could easily and more cost
effectively oe performea by E-3''s and below. Opponents of
this plan would quickly point out that it has the following
major weaknesses:
a. Establishment of the new rate would in effect causea
permanent shore billets for those specialists with
few afloat billets available for their utilization.
Additionally, there would be fewer shore billets
available for other rates rotating to shore.
b. The overall cost would be staggering. These are
valid points, however, with dedicated professional
law enforcement and security specialists, the Navy
installations would be in a better position to
protect life and property, enforce laws, regulations,
and policies, and prevent and/or deter theft and
other losses such as fire, damage, sabotage, and
provide for installation defense against
Demonstrations, militant groups, and terrorists.
The price of readiness is never cheap.
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APPENDIX A
MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL




1, Overv 1 ew/ Rol e of Introduction to the historical
Security Force background of Navy Law enforce-
Personnel ment or physical security with
emphasis on its relationship to
the modern aay Navy. Discuss
the organization of all Navy law
enforcement and physical
security programs under CNO
(OP-009D) with emphasis on the
trainee's role as a military or
civilian law enforcement/
physical security professional
within the present command.
2. Security Dept
.
Orientation to the organization
Organization, Duties and structure of the security
and Reponsibi 1 1 t les aepartment with emphasis on the
various duties and responsibi-
lities of their position and
all others, e.g. supervisors,
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posts, patrols, etc. Discussion
of applicable local directives,
instructions and regulations.
Trainee must be aware of command
mutual aid and support agree-




3. Standards of Conduct The trainee is presented with
the various Naval and law
enforcement standards of
conduct, appearance, and ethics
expected of all security force
personnel in the performance of
their duties, the exercise of
their police powers, and their
relationship to both the
civilian and military community.
Suggested reference; SECNAVINST
5370.20
4. Forms/Reports The trainee is presented the
Report Writing fundamentals of correct written
communication emphasizing proper
grammar, sentence structure and
spelling. Preparation and use
i+9
of the various forms and reports
used by security force
personnel. Suggested reference:
SECNAVINST 5216. 5C
5. ID^s, Decals and Introduction to the require-
Passes ments for i oent i f i cat i on ana
control of personnel, vehicles,
packages and materials entering
or exiting a command and
restricted areas. Required
local badges, identification
meoia, and control post
locations should be discussed





10242, OPNAVINST 3120. 32A
6. Area Familiarization The trainee should be presented
with a summary of command
geography, emphasizing high
crime, hazardous, restricted or
high security areas as well as
other areas of special interest,







given a summary of locations of
the various aivisions, depart-
ments, tenant commands, etc.
Suggested reference: Locally
prepared maps, charts, etc:
Command Organization Manual.
The trainee is taught the
handling procedures for the
recording, handling, and
disposition of the various types
of property coming into the
custody of the security
department, emphasizing special
procedures for evidence.
Trainee is taught the policy and
procedures for reporting
missing, lost, stolen, or
recovered government property.
Suggested reference: SECNAVINST
5500. 4D, OPNAVINST 5580.1
Introduction to the Command
Information Security Program and
trainee responsibility for
compliance with all of the
legally established directives
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9. Absentee and Deserters










The trainee is introduced to the
policy and proceaures for the
handling of absentees and
aeserters coming into their
custody. Suggested reference:
SECNAVINST 1620.7
Introduction to the elements
essential to building and




reference: Local Directives and
Guidance
The trainees examine their
jurisdiction over offenders and
limits of authority and juris-
diction in apprehension and
authority. The trainee discusses
the Jurisdiction and identifi-
cation of persons subject to the
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Rules of Evidence
3. Search and Seizure
UCMJ. Trainee discusses the
impact and limitation of the
Assimilative Crime Act, the
Posse Comitatus Act, applicable
state and local laws and their




10242, UCMJ, MCM, Assimilative
Crime Act, Posse Comitatus Act
Introduction to the Military
Rules of Evidence and applicable
civilian rules, the kinds of
evidence, the methods of
distinguishing relevance from




reference: UCMJ, MCM, 4th/5th
and 14th Amendments, NAVEDTRA
10242
Introduction to the basic
principles which constitute a
lawful search and/or seizure.
Basic understanding of the laws
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and judicial interpretations
that make them lawful, stressing
probable cause. Familiarization
with search warrants and the
procedural steps for securing




4th/5th/6th and 14th Amendments
4. Substantive The trainee is presented the
Criminal Law fundamentals of substantive law
relative to definitions and
classifications of crimes in
general. Suggested reference:
JAG Manual. MCM, NAVEDTRA 10242
5. Self-incrimination, The trainee is presented the use
Admissions and of Article 31, UCMJ and the 5th,
Confessions 6th, and 14th Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution as they
pertain to obtaining statements
or admissions from the accused,
witnesses, and suspects. Trainee
reviews the right of the
individual to due process of









nature of the waiver of rights,
the warning requirements
contained in the Federal
Statutes. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1. NAVEDTRA
10242, MCM, JAG Manual, UCMJ
The trainee identifies the
elements of a legal arrest/
apprehension and distinguishes
situations involving mere
suspicion, and probable cause.
The trainee should be able to
identify the essential criteria
for making a stop and frisk.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST
5580.1, MCM, NAVEDTRA 10242
A brief overview of the
administration, management, and
operation of Navy Brig and
detention cell as well as the
current philosophy and












Introduction to the military and
federal magistrate system
including the Assimilative Crime
Act as it applies to application
of state vehicle laws on naval
installations having exclusive




The implication and meaning of
sovereignty in international law
and role and purposes of
international agreements
pertaining to jurisdiction with
emphasis placed on the Status of
Forces Agreement. Suggested
reference: DOD Directive 5525.1
Presentation of the authority of
law enforcement personnel with
regard to the enforcement of





be familiar with the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, Public Law
93-415 of 1974. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1,
NAVEDTRA 10242
11. Judicial Proceedings, Presentation of the jurisdic-
Testimony and Demeanor tional limitations of non-
judicial punishment and duties
of the Master-at-Arms and
military and civilian law
enforcement personnel in
conjunction with Captain''s Mast,
courts of inquiry, civilian
courts, and courts martial.
Trainee should be familiar with
courtroom procedures, demeanor,
attitudes, and methods of
addressing questioner.
Suggested reference: SECNAVINST
1640.10, NAVEDTRA 10242, JAG
Manual , and UCMJ
TRAFFIC LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT
BLOCK #1
1. Military Traffic Law The trainee will receive the
Enforcement policies, responsibilities, and
procedures for motor vehicle
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traffic supervision, including
the traffic feaeral magistrate
system and the mechanics of
military and federal citation
issuance ( DD Form 1407 8. 1805).
Safe and efficient movement of
vehicles, materials, and
personnel to, from, and onboara
the command. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 11200. 5B,
OPNAVINST 5100. 12B, SECNAVINST
5822.
1
Mishap Investigation Basic knowledge of how to
and Reporting, Hit investigate a motor vehicle
and Run accident and a flexible plan of
action to deal with all phases
involving accidents.
Preparation and completion of
accident reports and related
documents. Overview of JAG
investigations of government
vehicle accidents. Suggested
reference: JAG Manual, NAVEDTRA
10242, OPNAVINST 11200.5B
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3. Driving Under the Drunk driving problem and its
Influence, Enforce- effect on accident ana death
ment, Implied Consent rates. Instruction in the
techniques for detecting,
apprehending, and testing
persons suspected of driving
under the influence of
intoxication. Familiarization
with field sobriety testing and




results of such tests.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST
5580.1, NAVEDTRA 10242,
Assimilative Crime Act, JAG
Manual , UCMJ
4. Traffic Control Basic principles of military
and Direction and Direction traffic control as
well as the methods and
techniques of traffic control.
Discussion of various traffic
situations, the establishment of
traffic and tactical posts,
controlling traffic flow, hand
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and arm signals, and direction
of traffic during the hours of
darkness. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, Army Field
Manual 19-10
5. Parking Enforcement, Presentation of local command
and Impounaing and impounding parking rules,
Vehicles regulations and laws with the
aim of the most efficient use of
existing on and off street
parking facilities. The trainee
should learn when the temporary
impoundment of vehicles is
authorized and the procedures
for doing so. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1,
OPNAVINST 11200.5, Uniform
Vehicle Code, Assimilative Crime
Act
BLOCK #2
6. Selective Enforcement Presentation of the planned
distribution of security force
personnel and equipment, includ-
ing radar, where and when needed









5580.1, NAVEDTRA 10242, Army
Field Manual 19-10
Presentation of those actions
which law enforcement personnel
can take to prevent crime as
well as how they can involve the
community at large (military or
civilian) through education and
participation. Introduction to
and how to conduct the various
forms of crime prevention
surveys. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1
Presentation with the procedures
for communications to include
types of calls, phonetic
alphabet, 24-hour time, the "10"
code, the correct construction
and delivery of messages, as
well as receiving and recording
messages. Familiarization with
the command radio and
telecommunications systems
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2. Routine and Special- Presentation to the primary
ized Building and purposes of patrols; to protect
Repository Escorts life and property, deter crime,
supervise road traffic laws and
regulations, maintain good order
and discipline, furnish
information and direction,




3. Vehicle Stops and Development of the ability to
Search of Vehicles make safe, effective vehicle
stops and control situations
that escalate after the stop.
Search of vehicles with the
legal decisions as to when and
where they are constitutionally
legal. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, NAVEDTRA
10242, Applicable State and
Federal Laws
4. Crimes in Progress The trainee is instructed with





1 . Terror i sm
a crime in progress emphasizing
safe, effective ariving,
approach, arrival, auties and
responsibilities at the scene,
search of the area, and inherent
dangers such as ambush, attacKS,
etc. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, NAVEDTRA 10242
Indoctrination and familiar-
ization with the command
physical security safeguard
requirements and policies
including perimeter gates and
fences, protective lighting,
intrusion detection systems,
their location, purpose and
required response times, key and




emphasizing and group or groups
known or suspected to be
operational in the area.









factors, targets, cell structure
of the group(s), etc. Response
to terrorists actions and
prevention measures should be
discussed. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, OPNAVINST
5530.15, OPNAVINST 3850 . 4A
The trainee should be able to
develop a plan of action to be
taken upon receipt of, during,
and after a bomb threat
including when or where not to
evacuate. Discussion of the
differences between destruction
and sabotage, stressing intent





Presentation of the various
activity disaster and emergency
bills with emphasis on roles in
the movement of essential
64
traffic to, from, and within the
stricken area; prevention of
further loss of life and
protection of property; care of
living casualties; and recovery,
removal, identification, and
disposition of the fatally
injured. Familiarization with
notifications and initial
actions required in the event of
any such emergency or disaster.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST
5580.1, Local Directives
Civil Disturbances, The trainee should be made aware
Crowd Mob Control of the responsibilities for the
protection of government
property and functions as well
as the legal restrictions
involved with that protection.
Use of minimum force policies
and riot control agents should
be discussed along with the
basic formations, weapons,
moves, and commands used for mob
and crowd control . Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1,






Presentation of the various
actions to be taKen ana notifi-
cations to be made upon arrival
at the scene of a hostage
Situation or barricaded suspect.
The basic responses available to
law enforcement personnel in
barricaded suspect/hostage
situations and the various
weapons, tactics, and actions to
be taken for each different
response. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, NAVEDTRA
10242, OPNAVINST 5530.15, Local
Di rect i ves
Presentation of those actions to
be taken and/or notifications
made in response to an animal
complaint; emphasis placed on
procedures in the event of an
animal bite and/or rabid animal.
Familiarization with those
organizations, military or
civilian, who will assist with,
and respond to, animal incidents
and removal . Suggested
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reference: Local Directives,
State and local shelters and
SPCA
7. Missing Persons, The trainee should receive the
Found Children and definitions, report require-
Senile Persons ments, and classifications of
missing persons with emphasis on
children. Difference between a
critical and non-critical
missing person and those actions
and notifications necessary for
each category. Procedures for
handling found children and
senile persons. Suggested
reference: Local Directives,
Local children''s shelters and
other agencies
8. Family Intervention, Introduction to the dangers
Spouse Abuse, Child inherent in crisis intervention
Abuse, Domestic within the domestic setting.
Conflict The need for sensitive but
thorough investigation in areas
such as child abuse, incest,
spouse abuse, and other offenses
directed against children and
the family. Also presented
should be those military and
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civilian agencies and advocate
groups available to assist with




charitable agencies and church
groups
Recognizing and The trainee is presented three
Hanoi ing Abnormal areas of abnormal behavior, i.e.
Behavior; Alcoholism, mental illness, mental retarda-
Drug Abuse, Mental tion, and psychopathic person-
Disorders ality. Presentation of the
specific symptoms for
recognition of behavior in each
of these areas and the generally
recommended methods for dealing
with each. Discussion of the
symptoms of drug and alcohol
abuse, emergency and medical
treatment, and handling of
individuals in possible violent
situations. Suggested
reference: National Mental
Health Association "How to
Recognize and Handle Abnormal
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People: A Guide for Police
Of f 1 cers"
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS
BLOCK #1
1 . Dr i ver Trai n i ng
2. Weapons Proficiency
3. Use of Minimum and
Deadly Force
Basic knowledge of emergency
vehicles. Presentation of
practical exercises for vehicle
stops, transporting prisoners,
and removal of reluctant
prisoners. Care and maintenance




pertaining to the handling and




safety procedures, and commands.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST
5580.1. SECNAVINST 5500.32
Presentation to the use and
types of force to be employed in
a variety of situations,
stressing the requirement for




Discussion of the legal, moral,
and ethical considerations




Basic principles of unarmed
self-defense utilizing balance,
leverage, and momentum. Use of
boton come-alongs and defense





NAVEDTRA 10242, FBI "Defensive
Tactics, A Manual for Law
Enforcement Officers"
Trainee must be physically fit
and rendered as such by
completion of the physical
training program. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1,
OPNAVINST 6110.1, FBI "Physical





7. Breath Testing and
Radar Certification
8. Fingerprints
The trainee will become
acquainted with the various
chemical agents used by the
security department and when
their use is justified.
Operation of such devices and
how to render first aid after
their use. Suggested reference
OPNAVINST 5580.1, NAVEDTRA
10242, Local Directives
Lecture and practical exercise
on procedures for setting up,
calibrating, testing, and
operating radar and breath
testing equipment used by the
security department. Written
examinations and practical
application should be given to
enable trainee to obtain
certification from the state or
jurisdiction where they are
author i zed.
Presentation of the practical





patterns. The development of
skills in taking rolled
impressions, and the processing
of latent prints for
Identification and use as
evidence. Suggested reference:
FBI's "The Science of
Fingerprints: Classification and
Uses", FBI's "Techniques for
TaKing Good Fingerprints"
The trainee is shown how to
aominister proper medical care
to victims of disasters,
illness, accidents, and other
trauma events when confronted
with situations that require
emergency medical management
techniques. Satisfactory
completion of either the Navy's
Standard First Aid Training
Course or the American Red Cross
Multimedia Standard First Aia
Course. Satisfactory completion















Presentation of the duties and
those reponsible for the
investigation of crimes and
security breaches on board the
command, what constitutes a
major versus a minor crime,
action to De taken when those
responsible are not available,
and other related matters. The
individual roles of NIS, command
investigators, the
Master-at-Arms , Shore Patrol,
FBI, and other law enforcement
agencies. Suggested reference:
OPNAVINST 5580.1, SECNAVINST
5520.3, SECNAVINST 5820.1, Local
Di rect i ves
Emphasis is placed upon the
importance of the preservation
of the crime scene. Introduction
to the identification of
physical evidence in a crime
scene setting. Techniques of
searching for evidence, the
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necessity for a sketch and how
to draw one, stressing essential
elements: notes and records to
be kept and crime scene
photography with the instruction
in the operation of cameras in
use by the department.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST
5580.1, NAVEDTRA 10242, Local
Di rect 1 ves
Identification of The trainee is acquainted with
Victims. Witnesses, the proper methods of identify-
and Suspects ing victims, missing persons,
suspects, and aeceased persons.
Stress the importance of
accurate identification and
relate how this information can
aid in the successful conclusion
of an investigation. Discussion
on the use of line-ups and
street showups as a method of
identification with emphasis on
the mechanics of properly
conducting them, time




NAVEDTRA 10242, Local Directives
4. Interviews and Instruction with use of
Interrogations; practical exercises in the
Notetaking and proper techniques of approach,
Statements along with the types of







5. Managing Informants The trainee is shown the
importance of sources and
informants in the successful
conduct of investigations.
Introduction to some of the
techniques used to recruit
informants. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1
6. Crimes Against Persons Presentation of the elements,
proof required, procedures, and
objective for the investigation
of such crimes against persons
as homicide, sex offenses,
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roboery, assault, etc. How to
conduct a thorough preliminary
investigation until the arrival




NAVEDTRA 10242, Local Directives
7. Crimes Against Property Presentation of the elements,
proof required, procedures, and
objectives for the investigation
of such crimes against property
as burglary, larceny, auto




8. Drugs, Identification, The trainee should develop an
and Control ability to identify current
drugs of abuse, use of generic
names as well as their street
names. A controlled burn should
be conducted to familiarize the
trainees with the odor of
marijuana, and a record of this
made in their service record.
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Discussion of the particular
arug problems of the command as
well as the Navy's effort to
combat the problem. Suggested
reference: OPNAVINST 5580.1,
OPNAVINST 5350.4, NAVEDTRA
10242, AMA's "Drug Abuse, A
Guide for the Primary Care
Physi c 1 an"
Vice Investigations, Discussion should be held with
Armed Forces the trainee on the Armed Forces
Disciplinary Boards Disciplinary Control Boards and
their mission, function,
organizations, limitations, and
authority. The on or off
installation drug, alcohol, or
vice conditions negatively
impacting upon the mission
should also be discussed.
Suggested reference: OPNAVINST




(Adapted from Tab A. OPNAVINST 5530. 14A)
A. COURSE OF INSTRUCTION
Ail personnel assigned to a law enforcement or physical
security function and who are aesignated to carry a v;eapon
shall receive a minimum of 16 hours of firearms instruction
as prescrioea oelow:
Top 1 cs Hours
Policy/Regulation 2
Use of Force, Safety, 1
Nomenc 1 ature
Li abi 1 1 ty 1










B. COMBAT PISTOL COURSE
The Combat Pistol Course ( CPC) are designed to be fired
on a 25 yard range, using standard silhouette targets and
turning type targets, if available. The firing points are
located at the Three yard line. Seven yard line, 15 yard
line, and the 25 yard line. Revolvers or semi-automatic
pistols may oe used for the CPC qualification. The course of
fire for either weapon is provided below.
1 . Course of Fire
.38 Caliber. Six-shot Revolver
a. Three Yard Line
12 rounds, double action, one quick point
position. The shooter stands with the weapon empty and
holstered with 48 rounds available. On the command of the
range officer, the shooter will load six rounds and holster
the weapon. The shooter will then load six rounds in the
ammunition pouch. On the command of the range officer, the
shooter will draw the weapon and assume a quick point
position, fire two rounds, and cover the target until
instructed to holster the weapon. On the command of the
range officer, the shooter will draw and fire two rounds from
the quick point position and cover the target until
instructed to holster the weapon. The time limit for drawing
and firing each two round sequence is four seconds. On the
command of the range officer, the shooter will draw and fire
two rounds from the quick point position, immediately unload
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the expended rounds, load two rounas from the ammunition
pouch, fire those rounas from the quick point position, and
then cover the target. When instructed, the shooter will
unload and reload two additional rounds from the ammunition
pouch, and holster the weapon. On the command of the range
officer, the shooter will draw and fire two rounas from the
quicK point position, immediately un 1 oao the expenoed rounds,
ana reload two rounds from the ammunition pouch, ana fire
those rounas from the quicK point point and then cover the
target until instructed to unload and holster the weapon.
The time limit for each four round sequence is 15 seconds.
D. Seven Yard Line
12 rounds. douDle action, quick point position
fired in the same manner as the three yard line portion.
C. 15 Yaro Line
12 rounds, aouble action, point shoulder position
fired in the same manner as the three yard line portion.
d. 25 Yard Line
12 rounds, double action,! oarricade position.
The shooter stands behind the barricade with the weapon empty
and holstered. On the command of the range officer, the
shooter loads six rounds in the weapon, holsters and loads
SIX rounds in the ammunition pouch. On the command of the
range officer, the shooter will araw the weapon ana fire six
rounds from the right siae barricade position. The shooter
will then immediately unload the expended rounds, reload with
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SIX rounds from the ammunition pouch and fire six rounds from
the left side barricade position. The shooter will cover the
target until instructed to unload and holster. The time
limit for the entire sequence is one minute.
1 . Course of Fire
.45 Calioer Semi -Automat i c and 9mm Semi -Automat i
c
Pistols.
a. Three Yard Line
Ten rounds, quick point position. The shooter
stands with the weapon empty and holstered with 40 rounds and
two magazines available. On the command of the range
officer, the shooter will insert a five round magazine in the
weapon, holster, and have a five round magazine available.
On the command of the range officer, the shooter will araw
the weapon and assume the quick point position, fire two
rounos ana continue to cover the target until instructed to
holster. On the command of the range officer, the shooter
Will draw and fire two rounds from the quick point position
and cover the target until instructed to holster the weapon.
The time limit is four seconds for drawing and firing each
two round sequence. On the command of the range officer, the
shooter will draw the weapon, fire one round from the quick
point position, immediately drop the empty magazine, insert
the spare magazine, fire one round from the quick point
position, and then cover the target. The time limit for this
phase IS ten seconds. On the command of the range officer,
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the shooter wi I 1 then repeat the same two round phases as set
forth above.
b. Seven Yard Line
Ten rounds, quick point position fired in the
same manner as the three yard line portion.
c. 15 Yard Line
Ten rounds, point shoulder position fired in the
same manner as the three yard line portion.
d. 25 Yard Line
Ten rounds, barricade position. The shooter stands behind
the oarricade with the weapon empty and holstered. On the
command of the range officer, tne shooter inserts a five
round magazine in the weapon, holsters, and has a five round
magazine available. On the command of the range officer, the
shooter will draw the weapon and fire five rounds from the
right side oarricade position, strong hand. The shooter will
then immediately drop the empty magazine, insert the spare
magazine, and fire five rounds from the left side barricade
position, strong hand. The shooter will then cover the
target until instructed to drop the empty magazine and
holster the weapon. The time limit for the entire sequence
1 s one mi nute
.
3. Scoring the Combat Pistol Course (Scoring should be
done using the values on the target.)
Scoring the six-shot revolver:
Possibl e score 240
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Scoring the .45 and 9mm Semi -Automat i c Pistols:
Possi bl e Score 200





C. FAMILIARIZATION FIRE COURSE
All security force personnel authorized to carry
firearms, should be required to qualify quarterly utilizing
the Combat Pistol Course ( CPC) . However, time and ammunition
restraints will in some cases make this goal untenable.
Therefore, an alternative is necessary. The Familiarization
Fire Course was designed for this purpose. The course is
designed for 12 rounds of ammunition with six additional
rounds optional, depending on their availability. Firearm
qualification utilizing the CPC is required annually and
Familiarization Fire Course during the other three-quarters
of the year may be substituted. All shooting for the
Familiarization Fire Course is done double action. The
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Familiarization Fire Course format for the revolver or
semi-automatic pistols is provided.
1 . Course of Fire
.38 Caliber. Six-Shot Revolver.
a. Three Yard Line
Four rounds, double action, quicK point position.
The shooter stands with the weapon empty and holstered with
12 rounds available. On the command of the range officer,
the shooter will load six rounds and holster the weapon. On
the command of the range officer, the shooter will draw the
weapon and assume a quick point position, fire two rounds,
and cover the target until instructed to holster the weapon.
On the command of the range officer, the shooter will draw
and fire two rounds from the quick point position and then
cover the target until instructed to holster the weapon. The
time limit for firing each two round sequence is four
seconds
.
b. Seven Yard Line
Four rounds, double action, quick point position.
The shooter stands at the firing line with the weapon empty.
On the command of the range officer, the shooter will load
two rounds, fire, immediately unload the expended rounds,
load two rounds from the ammunition pouch, and fire those two
rounds. The shooter will cover the target until instructed
to holster the weapon. The time limit for this four round
sequence is 15 seconds.
c. 15 Yard Line
Four rounds, aouole action, quick point position.
The shooter stands at the firing line with the weapon empty.
On the command of the range officer, the shooter wi 1 i load
two rounas ana holster the weapon. On the commano of the
range officer, the shooter will draw ana fire two rounds from
the quicK point position, immediately unloaa the expenaea
rounds. 1 oaa two rounds from the ammunition pouch, fire tv;o
rounas again from the quick point position, and then cover
the target until instructed to holster the weapon. The time
limit for this four round sequence is 15 seconds.
a. 25 Yard Line (Optional and not usea to compute
the score if fired)
Six rounds, aouble action, barricade position.
The shooter stanas behind the oarricaae with the weapon empty
ana holsterea. On the command of the range officer, the
shooter loads three rounas in the weapon, holsters, ana then
puts three rounds in the ammunition pouch. On the command of
the range officer, the shooter will draw the weapon and fire
three rounds from the left side oarricade position. The
shooter will then immeaiately unload the expended rounds,
load three rounds from the ammunition pouch, fire the three
rounds from the right barricade position, ana cover the
target until instructed to holster the weapon. The time
limit for this six round sequence is 45 seconds.
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1 . Course of Fire
.45 Calioer ana 9rnrn Semi -Automat i c Pistols
The Fami i 1 ar 1 zac 1 on Fire Course for tne .45 calioer
ana 9mm semi-automatic pistols is oasicaily che same as the
course aoove for tne .38 calioer revolver. The only
aifference is tnat tne snooter vn 1 1 1 oaa a magazine into tne
pistol with the specif lea numoer of rounas for each sequence
ana have a magazine with tne specifieo number of rounas
availaole. when requireo. for tne unload^' ioaa sequences.
a. Scoring Familiarization Fire (Scoring should be
aone using tne values on the target.)
Possible Score 60
Minimum qualifying score 42
D. NIGHTFIRE EXERCISE
In order to familiarize security force personnel with the
inherent nanoicaps of night fire ana the necessary
com.pensat 1 ons . the Nightfire Exercise set forth oe 1 ow should
oe fired annually m lieu of one of the three quarterly
Familiarization Fires. The weapon shoula be firea from oe 1 ow
the line of sight, not the point shouiaer position. The
reason is to keep the muzzle flash, that can severly impair
the shooter' s night vision, low ana away from the shooter.
The shooters must be aole to unloab ana load by feel alone.
All firing for this course is done double action.
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i * Lour^e ot i: : re
.38 CaliDer Revolver
a. Three Yard Line
Four rounas. aouole action, with target
iliuminarea oy a vehicle s neadiignts parKea oehind the seven
yard iine of fire. The shooters stanos wiih the weapon empty
and nol stereo with 12 rounds available. On tne command of
the range officer, the snooter will draw and fire two rounds,
then cover the target until instructeo to holster the weapon.
The time limit for orawing and firing each two round sequence
IS four seconds. The headlights are then extmguisheo ana on
the command of the range officer, the shooter will unload the
expended rounds, i oao four rounds, and holster the weapon.
Gn tne command of the range officer, the shooter will move to
the seven yard line position.
D. Seven Yara Line
Phase I, Four rounas, two rounas per four
seconds, double action, total darKness. same sequence as in
the three yard line portion.
c. Seven Yard Line
Phase II, Four rounds, two rounds per four
seconds, douole action, same sequence as in the three yard
line portion, using a flashlight. The flashlight is held in
the non-shooting hand. On the command of the range office,
the shooter will turn the flashlight on the target, holoing
It up and away from the oody , fire two rounds, and turn the
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.45 Caliber and 9mm Semi -Automat i c Pistols
The nightfire exercise for the .45 calmer and 9mm
semi-automatic pistols are oasically the same course as set
forth aoove for the .38 calioer revolver. The only
difference is that the shooter will load a magazine into the
pistol with the specifiea number of rounas for each sequence
and have a magazine with the specified numoer of rounds
avaiiaole, when required, for the unload/load sequences.
2 Scoring The Nightfire Exercise .
Scoring the nightfire exercise is done by counting
the number of hits within the silhouette target versus the
scoring values. Shooters will not normally be disqualifiea
from carrying weapons for a failure to qualify on this
course. The course is designed to familiarize the shooter
with firing conditions under impaired light or darkness. A
failure to qualify indicates a need for adaitional
f ami i 1 ar 1 zat 1 on
.
Poss ible score 12 hits
Minimum qualifying score 8 hits
E. TRANSITION COURSE
The oDjective of the Transition Course is to enhance
Dasic skills training and development of skills with
sidearms. Since there are only six alternative ways of
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firing a sidearm ( strongnand. weak nana, single action,
double action, one hand, and two hands) mastering them will
result in higher Combat Pistol and Familiarization Course
scores
.
1 . Course of Fire
.38 Caliber Revolver
a. 15 Yard Line
Four stages, twelve rounds per stage, quick point
position without support. The shooter stands with the weapon
empty and holstered with 48 rounds available. On the command
of the range officer, at the beginning of each stage, the
shooter will load with six rounds and holster the weapon. On
the command of the range officer for each stage, the shooter
will draw and fire six rounds, unload the expended rounds,
load with SIX rounas, and fire. The time limit is one minute
per page. The four stages are fired as follows:
(1) Stage One . 12 rounds, strong hand, single
act 1 on .
(2) Stage Two . 12 rounds, strong hand, aouble
act 1 on .
C3) Stage Three . 12 rounds, weak hand, single
act 1 on
.




.45 Caliber ana 9min Semi -Automat i c Pistols
a. 15 Yard Line
The Transition Course for nhe pistols is
basically the same as that of the .38 caliber revolver. At
the command of the range officer at the beginning of each
stage, the shooter will insert a five round magazine m tne
weapon, holster, and have a five round miagazine availaole.
On the command of the range officer for each stage, the
shooter will draw and fire five rounds, drop the empty
magazine, insert the spare magazine, and fire.
2 Scoring the Transition Course
Scoring is done by counting the number of hits within
the silhouette target to estaolish a satisfactory or
unsatisfactory rating. An unsatisfactory rating merely
indicates a need for additional training.
Rating the revolver:
Possi Die score 48 hits
Sat isf actory 32+ hits
Unsatisfactory 31- hits
Rating the pistols:
Possibl e score 40 hits




The shotgun course is aesigned to provide training in
safety, loaaing, and firing the shotgun from the hip and the
shoulder positions. The course is shot on a 25 yard range
With firing points at the 15 and 25 yard lines. Only one
shooter will shoot at a time. Two shooters may fire at the
same time if separaiied oy a minimum of 20 feet and two
qualifiea instructors are present. Five Army E type targets
spaced four feet apart, numbered left to right, one through
five, will oe used. If five closely spaced targets is not
possible, then the alternate course of fire shall be used.
Both the regular and alternate course of fire consist of
three phases with a total of 12 rounds. The shotgun course
will be fired by each individual quarterly. The load for all
pnases will be 00-buckshot. There is no time limit on any
phase. Safety, familiarity, and accuracy should oe stressed.
1 . Regular Course of Fire
(a) Phase I
Five rounds, three standing and two kneeling
from 25 yards. The shooter takes up a position on the 25
yard line with the shotgun at port arms, action open, and the
safety on. Five rounds of ammunition are placed in the front
pants pocket opposite of the strong hand. On the command of
the range officer, the shooter loads three rounas (one in the
chamoer), then assumes a port arms position facing the
targets with the action closed and the safety on. When the
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commence fire signal is given, the shooter will oring tne
shotgun to the shoulder position, strong nana, remove tne
safety, and fire three rounds, one each at three targets.
Afcer firing the three rounds, on command, the shdoter will
load two rounds Cone in the chamoer ) and assume a port arms
position facing the targets. On the commence fire signal,
the shooter will assume the Kneeling position, remove the
safety, and fire the two rounds, one each at the targets.
After firing the two rounds, the shooter will open the
action, put the safety on, hold the shotgun at port arms, and
move forward to the 15 yard line for Phase II.
Cb) Phase II
Five rounds, four from the hip and one from the
kneeling strong shoulder position at 15 yards. On the
command of the range officer, the shooter loads three rounds
(one m the chamber), then assumes a port arms position
facing the targets with the action closed and the safety on.
When the commence fire signeal is given, the shooter assumes
the hip position, removes the safety and fires three rounds,
one eacn at three targets. Ater firing the three rounds, the
action IS opened, the safety is put on, and the shotgun is
held at port arms. On command, the shooter loads two rounds
Cone in the chamber) and assumes a port arms position facing
the targets. On the commence fire signal, the shooter
assumes the hip position, removes the safety and fires one
round. The shooter then assumes the kneeling position and
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fires the remining rouna from the shoulaer position (strong
hana) . The shooter then stands, opens the action, puts the
safety on and holds the shotgun at port arms.
(c) Phase III
Two rounds, fired from the shoulder position,
weak hana, at 15 yaras. On the command of the range officer,
the shooter loads two rounds (one in the chamoer ) , closes tne
action, releases the safety, and assumes the proper port arms
psition for the weak hand. When the commence fire signal is
given, the snooter brings the shotgun to the weak hand
shoulder, and fires two rounds at two targets. The action is
then opened, the safety placed on, and the strong hand port
arms position is assumed.
2 . Alternate Course of Fire
(a) Phase I
Five rounds, three standing and two kneeling from
25 yards. The shooter takes up a position on the 25 yard
line with the shotgun at port arms, action open, and the
safety on. The shooter has five rounds of ammunition in the
front pants pocket opposite his strong hand. On the command
of the range officer, the shooter loads three rounds (one in
the chamber) and assumes a port arms position facing the
target with the action closed and the safety on. When the
commence fire signal is given, the shooter brings the
shotgun to the strong hand shoulder, removes the safety, and
fires three rounds. After firing the three rounds, the
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action IS opened, the safety is put on, ana the shotgun is
hela ac port arms. On commana, at the 25 yard line, two
rounds Cone in the chamoer) are loaded. When commence fire
IS given, the shooter assumes the Kneeling position, removes
tne safety, and fires dotn rounds. The action is opened, the
safety is put on, ana with the shotgun at port arms, tne
shooter moves up to the 15 yard line.
(b) Phase II
Five rounds, four from the hip position and one
from the kneeling position at 15 yards. On command of the
range officer, the shooter loads three rounds (one in the
chamber) ana assumes the port arms position facing the
targets with the action closed and the safety on. When the
commence fire signal is given, the shooter assumes the hip
position, removes the safety, and fires three rounds. After
firing the three rounds, the action is opened, safety put on,
ana the shotgun is hela at port arms. On commana, at the 15
yara line, the shooter 1 oaas two rounas Cone in the chamber),
ana assumes a port arms position facing the target with the
action c 1 osea ana the safety on. When the commence fire
signal is given, the shooter assumes the hip position,
removes the safety, fires one rouna, then assumes the
Kneeling position ana fires the remaining rouna. The shooter
maKes the shotgun safe (action open, safety on), ana hoias
the weapon at port arms.
9k
(c) Phase II
Two rounds fired from the shoulder position,
weak nana, at 15 yaras. On commana of the range officer, the
shooter loads two rounds (one in the chamber), closes the
action, releases the safety, ana assumes the proper port armiS
position for the weak hana. When the commence fire signal is
given, the shooter brings the shotgun to the weak hand
shoulder and fires two rounds. The shooter then opens the
action, puts the safety on, and assumes the port arms
posi 1 1 on
.
3. Dual 1 f 1 cat i on
There is no numerical qualification score for the
shotgun. The range officers are responsible for certifying
that the individuals observea can safely handle and fire the
shotgun with some aegree of accuracy.
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